Option 2. The claim that best addresses this claim that people are only honest when there is a financial incentive is: Employees tend to be more honest when they like their boss and their work.
This can be described to be a claim that was made as a form of rebuttal to a previous claim that has been made.
The claim that is being rebutted here is that employed people cheat more as they climb up the corporate ladder.
His counterclaim is attributing honesty to a good environment where the people love their boss and their jobs and have good morale.
Hence we can conclude on the second option. The counterclaim points to the fact that financial incentive is not the only reason why people are honest. Likeness for their bosses and jobs is one of the reasons.
Read the excerpt from Levitt and Dubner’s Freakonomics.
Feldman has also reached some of his own conclusions about honesty, based more on his experience than the data. He has come to believe that morale is a big factor—that an office is more honest when the employees like their boss and their work. He also believes that employees further up the corporate ladder cheat more than those down below. He got this idea after delivering for years to one company spread out over three floors—an executive floor on top and two lower floors with sales, service, and administrative employees. (Feldman wondered if perhaps the executives cheated out of an overdeveloped sense of entitlement. What he didn’t consider is that perhaps cheating was how they got to be executives.)
Which idea from the excerpt best addresses the counterclaim that people are only honest when there is a financial incentive?
Employees who move further up the corporate ladder tend to be more dishonest.
Employees tend to be more honest when they like their boss and their work.
Executives might act dishonestly out of an overdeveloped sense of entitlement.
Different employees of the same business demonstrate varying levels of honesty.
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